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Abstract : The ﬁnancial cost of corruption has recently been estimated at
more than 5 per cent of global GDP. Yet, despite the widespread agreement that
corruption is one of the most pressing policy challenges facing world leaders, it
remains as widespread today, possibly even more so, as it was when concerted
international attention began being devoted to the issue following the end of the
Cold War. In reality, we still have a relatively weak understanding of how best
to measure corruption and how to develop effective guides to action from such
measurement. This paper provides a detailed review of existing approaches to
measuring corruption, focusing in particular on perception-based and non-
perceptual approaches. We highlight a gap between the conceptualisation of
corruption and its measurement, and argue that there is a tension between the
demands of policy-makers and anti-corruption activists on the one hand, and the
motivations of academic researchers on the other. The search for actionable
answers on the part of the former sits uncomfortably with the latter’s focus on the
inherent complexity of corruption.
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policy
Introduction
The World Economic Forum estimates the cost of corruption to be more than
5 per cent of global GDP (US $2.6 trillion), and the World Bank believes over
$1 trillion is paid in bribes each year (CleanGovBiz 2013). Of course, it is
impossible to know with certainty what the actual ﬁgures are, given that
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corruption by its nature is usually clandestine, but there can be little doubt that
corruption represents one of the most pressing public policy challenges faced
by governments across the world. Indeed, there is now a broad consensus in
academic research that corruption is almost always damaging (in contrast to
an earlier belief that it could sometimes help bypass obstructive bureaucracy),
but there remain fundamental disagreements about how it should be mea-
sured, what the most effective means to reduce its occurrence and impact are,
andwhat level of priority it should be given, in comparison to, for example, the
alleviation of poverty, conﬂict resolution and so on. In this review, we focus on
the vexed question of measurement: if we are to stand any chance of devel-
oping effective anti-corruption policies, we need to have reliable indicators of
both the extent and the location of corruption.
There have been several attempts to develop indicators for corruption. As
Hawken and Munck (2009, 21) have recognised, the task of measuring
corruption – especially by developing cross-national data sets of broad
scope – is laudable and welcome; unfortunately, however, variations in
reported levels of corruption are as likely to be a product of prevailing
corruption measures, and the methods that are used to create these mea-
sures, as they are to reﬂect actual levels of corruption. From a policy per-
spective, this issue is of signal importance. In 2008, the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) Oslo Governance Centre published
A User’s Guide to Measuring Corruption (UNDP 2008), which sought to
identify the strengths and limitations of different approaches to measure-
ment and to provide practical guidance on how policy-makers should use
the indicators and data generated by corruption measurement tools.
The UNDP guide suggests an informal taxonomy that classiﬁes corrup-
tion indicators by four categories: (1) the scale and scope of indicators;
(2) what is actually being measured; (3) the methodology employed; and
(4) the role that internal and/or external stakeholders play in generating the
assessments. However, the key issue from the perspective of international
agencies, such as the UNDP or the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development and its Development Assistance Committee, is the need to
develop actionable indicators that measure speciﬁc features of corruption and
that are directly linked to policy decisions:
To put it plainly, there is little value in a measurement if it does not tell us
what needs to be ﬁxed. (UNDP 2008, 8)
Effective measurement is thus an essential starting point, but it will be
argued in this review of existing approaches that the most commonly used
attempts have been beset by conceptual, methodological or political pro-
blems (or a combination of all three) that constrain their utility as a guide to
developing effective anti-corruption policies.
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This article is developed in three parts. In the ﬁrst, we explore perception-
based measurements of corruption, which remain the most widely used,
focusing in particular on conceptual and methodological issues. We argue
that there is a gap between the concept of corruption and its measurement,
resulting in outcomes that may be reliable, but not necessarily valid: that is,
perceptions of corruption may reﬂect a reality, but that reality may not
relate to corruption as opposed to other issues. In the second part, we
explore non-perceptual approaches to measuring corruption, arguing that
they also suffer from problems of deﬁnition, have a more limited scope and
applicability, and do not lend themselves to the effective use of the kinds
of mathematical models that have become increasingly common in the
analysis of electoral fraud. In the ﬁnal part, we examine the tension between
the demands of policy-makers and anti-corruption activists on the one
hand, and the motivations of academic researchers on the other. The search
for actionable answers on the part of the former sits uncomfortably with the
latter’s focus on the inherent complexity of corruption.
Perception-based measures
The dominant mode of measuring corruption since the mid-1990s has been
perception-based via cross-national indices drawn from a range of surveys
and expert assessments. This dominance has been reﬂected in measures like
the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the Bribe Payers Index and other
aggregate indicators, such as the control of corruption element in theWorld
Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Such indices have
undoubtedly proven immensely important in raising awareness of the issue
of corruption, as well as forming the basis of cross-country comparisons
[Transparency International (TI) 2009]. Yet, despite their importance,
it is now widely acknowledged that such measures are inherently prone
to bias and serve as imperfect proxies for actual levels of corruption
(Razaﬁndrakoto and Roubaud 2006; Kurtz and Shrank 2007). At the same
time, the lack of an authoritatively agreed upon deﬁnition of what counts as
corruption remains a serious obstacle to measurement. In practice, speciﬁc
indicators inevitably (even if implicitly) reﬂect particular deﬁnitions
(Hawken andMunck 2009). This latter point is especially serious. By virtue
of their different foci, these indicators (that all putatively refer to corrup-
tion) can allow for fundamentally different interpretations of substantive
relationships.
Perhaps the most widely used approach to measuring corruption has
been TI’s CPI. Published annually since 1995, the CPI:
captures information about the administrative and political aspects of
corruption. Broadly speaking, the surveys and assessments used to compile the
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index include questions relating to bribery of public ofﬁcials, kickbacks in
public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and questions that probe
the strength and effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption efforts (TI 2010).
The CPI is a composite index, calculated using data sources from a variety
of other institutions along with information from previous CPI indices. For
example, 13 surveys and assessments published between 2011 and 2012
were used for the 2012 index (TI 2012).
Despite wide use, the CPI has become increasingly controversial, parti-
cularly in regard to its methodology and the use to which it has been put
(see, for instance, Razaﬁndrakoto and Roubaud 2006; de Maria 2008;
Weber Abramo 2008; Andersson and Heywood 2009; Hawken and
Munck 2009; Thomas 2010). As its title explicitly notes, the CPI measures
perceptions and not, say, reported cases, prosecutions or proven incidences
of corruption. Like the CPI, the World Bank’s WGI also include perception
measures, in this case relating to the “control of corruption” (CC), where
corruption is taken to be the exercise of public power for private gain
(Kaufmann et al. 2008; see also Thomas 2010).
One recognised limit of aggregate perception data is that most factors
that predict perceived corruption, such as level of economic development,
state of democracy, press freedom and so forth, do not correlate well with
available measures of actual corruption experiences (Triesman 2007). The
potential scale of the disparity between perception and experiences of
corruption is starkly shown in a series of Eurobarometer studies of the
attitudes of Europeans to corruption (European Commission 2006, 2008,
2009, 2012). The latest, conducted in September 2011, found that a strikingly
high proportion of EU citizens (74 per cent, on average) saw corruption as a
“major problem” in their country, occurring within local (76 per cent),
regional (75 per cent) and national (79 per cent) institutions. In just ﬁve
countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden) did
fewer than half of respondents agree. Yet, personal experience of corruption
remained strikingly low, with an overall average of just 8 per cent of respon-
dents having been asked to pay any form of a bribe for access to services during
the preceding 12 months; in only four countries (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia
and Romania) did more than 20 per cent report having been asked to pay a
bribe (European Commission 2012).
More generally, reﬂecting the same pitfalls in survey research beyond
Europe, Triesman (2007, 212) cautions, “it could be that the widely used
subjective indexes are capturing not observations of the frequency of cor-
ruption but inferences made by experts and survey respondents on the basis
of conventional understandings of corruption’s causes”. A recent detailed
study of the relationship between the CPI and TI’s Global Corruption
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Barometer, which seeks to capture the lived experience of corruption
through the eyes of ordinary citizens, has also shown persuasively that
personal experience is a poor predictor of the population’s perceptions;
furthermore, “the ‘distance’ between opinions and experiences vary
haphazardly from country to country” (Weber Abramo 2008, 5). In a
similar vein, a detailed review of perceptual measures of corruption and
experienced-based measures of corruption has shown that, while percep-
tions and experiences are highly correlated in general, the relationship
between them is non-linear (Donchev and Ujhelyi 2009, 9–10). In practice,
this means that measures like the CPI are better able to discriminate
between countries in which citizens experience the lowest levels of corrup-
tion and worse at discriminating between those in which citizens experience
higher levels (Donchev and Ujhelyi 2009, 35). Perceptions of corruption
also appear to respond to the absolute level of corruption within countries,
rather than the relative level (Donchev and Ujhelyi 2009, 18). This means
that, even if the number of corruption incidents per person in the popula-
tion is identical, a country with a larger population is more likely to have a
worse perceived level of corruption. Moreover, general perceptions cannot
differentiate between various types of corruption, nor between corruption
in different sectors (e.g. judicial, ﬁnancial, health and so forth) within
countries. To the extent that the amount of corruption and the nature of
corruption differ systematically between different sectors, this is an espe-
cially serious loss.
Since the CPI draws upon a series of surveys in order to generate the ﬁnal
index, it could theoretically offer insights into a wide variety of behaviours
that could be called corrupt and a wide variety of situations in which
corruption occurs. However, the surveys that the CPI is based upon have
a far narrower frame of reference in practice, focusing primarily upon
the perceptions of business leaders and country experts (Philp 2006, 50;
Andersson and Heywood 2009, 752–753). One consequence is that cor-
ruption is most likely to be understood in terms of ﬁnancial corruption that
affects businesses – a focus which may serve to obscure the distinctions
between different types of corruption and potentially even mask the effects
of corruption (Knack 2006, 2; Andersson and Heywood 2009, 753; Kenny
2009, 328; Olken 2009, 951).
Furthermore, while constituent surveys of the CPI probably over-
represent business-related ﬁnancial corruption, each survey has its own
(implicit) understanding of corruption. Amalgamating responses into a
single index may produce unhelpful conceptual conﬂation, even if this is not
reﬂected statistically (Saisana and Saltelli 2012, 11). Since the aim is to produce
a single measure of corruption perceptions, and thus the index includes
non-ﬁnancial measures, such conﬂation can have serious consequences.
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Indeed, the approach effectively gives greater or lesser emphasis to quali-
tatively different conceptualisations in the ﬁnal ranking in proportion to the
number of surveys that use a particular conceptualisation. A country may
have a relatively low level of ﬁnancial corruption coupled with a relatively
high level of political corruption (vote buying, electoral fraud, etc.); yet, the
extent to which each of these factors is reﬂected in the ﬁnal score is ulti-
mately determined by the frequency of each conceptualisation within the
constituent surveys. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the frequency
of any given conceptualisation is proportionate to its importance.
Like the CPI, the WGI use a composite approach based upon a series of
other indices: control of corruption (CC), voice and accountability, rule of
law, government effectiveness, political stability and regulatory quality. As
Apaza (2009, 140) has argued, the validity of applying the index rests on
the ability of the individual WGI component indices to discriminate effec-
tively between the six concepts and to be different from other measures of
government performance. Recently, however, using both measurement and
structural models, Langbein and Knack (2010) have argued that the six
indicators are not empirically distinct. To the extent that these indicators
are assumed to be independent while not being empirically so, results may
be substantively misleading.Moreover, analyses have shown that, while the
indicators can provide a statistically reliable measure, “what they reliably
measure is not so clear” (Langbein and Knack 2010, 365). Indeed, as
Thomas (2010, 39) has argued, “some of the constructs themselves are
poorly deﬁned and may be meaningless”. Similarly, the UNDP (2008, 26)
commented that, “by aggregating many component variables into a single
score or category, users run the risk of losing the conceptual clarity that is so
crucial”. If users are unable to understand or unpack the concept that is
being measured, their ability to draw out informed policy implications is
severely constrained.
It is of note that the CPI and the WGI are published annually (although
the latter are not presented in league table format). While TI has been
explicit that its methodology was “not designed to allow country scores to
be compared over time” (TI, 2011a), the annual publication of results
inevitably invites precisely such comparisons (see also Treisman 2007, 220;
Andersson and Heywood 2009). This is an avenue of investigation that has
been pursued by both TI itself in its press releases (see, e.g. TI 2007), as well
as by academic researchers (Treisman 2007, 220; for speciﬁc examples of
the CPI being used for comparisons over time, see Herzfeld andWeiss 2003,
Catrinescu et al. 2008 and Bussell 2011; for theWGI being used in a similar
way, see Kaufmann et al. 2009). Despite the caution against using the CPI
for comparisons between time points, the fact that it happens makes the
variability of the CPI (and other annual perception-based measures) over
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time an important topic in its own right. If the variability in countries’
scores between years is very marked, we may question whether the CPI
offers valid measurements. After all, the CPI is a single measure, purporting
to measure a single (latent) construct with a consistent scale range.
Similarly, the absence of any substantively important variation in the
scores over time would indicate a poor, and potentially misleading, measure.
Indeed, the annual publication of results in league table format places an
emphasis on the idea that change actually exists, regardless of its speciﬁc cause.
Each year, attention is inevitably drawn to those countries whose scores have
changed. This attention allows regimes – including highly corrupt regimes – to
trumpet their success when the ranking appears to be more positive, while
glossing over or ignoring downward trends (Andersson and Heywood 2009,
754). If no systematic change is happening, the CPI becomes less an advocacy
tool for the ﬁght against corruption and more a tool that can be manipulated
for political ends by corrupt regimes.
In order to test whether the CPI is capable of providing useful informa-
tion over time, it is necessary to analyse a set of country scores for one year
against those for another. However, it is important to note that, within the
CPI’s methodology, an implicit “lag” exists, because country scores are
generated each year using data that is up to 2 years old (TI 2011b). Given
that the CPI is calculated yearly, this means that, in practice, scores are
usually calculated using at least some of the same data as was used in the
previous year’s score. In order to avoid these potential problems, we take an
11-year gap, focusing upon the scores reported in the 2001 CPI and the
scores for the same countries reported in the 2012 CPI.1 A plot of these data
is shown in Figure 1.
As is immediately apparent, there is a very strong linear relationship
between 2012 scores and 2001 scores. Moreover, the OLS regression line,
the y = x line, and the LOWESS smoothed line all lie within a very short
distance from each other. This is further evidence of the strikingly strong
interconnection between the 2012 and 2001 scores. In order to test the extent
to which the 2001 scores can explain the 2012 scores, we conducted an OLS
regression analysis with the 2012 values as the dependent variable and the
2001 values as the independent variable. This analysis showed that the 2001
scores explain around 89 per cent of the variance of the 2012 scores.2
1 CPI data for 2001 available from http://archive.transparency.org/content/download/1939/
11445/ﬁle/ti_cpi_2001_data.zip and CPI data for 2012 available from http://ﬁles.transparency.
org/content/download/533/2213/ﬁle/2012_CPI_DataPackage.zip (accessed 3 July 2013).
2 UsingOLS regression. The results show an intercept of 1.095 (p< 0.001) and an estimate for
the slope of 0.818×CPI score in 2001 (p<0.001). Adjusted r2 = 0.887; n = 91.
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A parallel exercise using the CC index from the WGI3 produces strikingly
similar results (see Figure 2). In this case, there is a very strong linear rela-
tionship between 2011 and 2000 scores, and again the regression line, the
y = x line, and the LOWESS smoothed line are all very close to each other.
In this instance, the OLS regression analysis we conducted shows that about
86 per cent of the variance of the 2011 score is explained by the 2000
score.4 This demonstrates remarkable consistency over time, especially
given the inherent measurement error associated with perception-based
measures. Indeed, these ﬁndings for both the CPI and the WGI suggest
essentially no substantive change over time.
This lack of change, far from being comforting, suggests that observed
ﬂuctuations in the CPI and the WGI on a year-to-year basis are likely to be
misleading, both in terms of policy discussions and as a resource for
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12
Figure 1 Countries’ corruption perceptions index (CPI) scores in 2001 and 2012.
The dotted line shows an OLS regression line ﬁtted to the data. The dashed line
shows the relationship when the y values are exactly equal to the x values. The solid
line is a non-parametric (LOWESS) smooth line, which can take any shape in order
to follow the data. The analysis shows all 91 countries from the 2001 CPI.
Source: authors’ own calculation.
3 Data available from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed 3 July
2013).
4 UsingOLS regression. The results show an intercept of −0.003 (p>0.85) and an estimate for
the slope of 0.926×WGI score in 2000 (p<0.001). Adjusted r2 = 0.863; n = 196.
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research. While it is the case that scores in these indices vary from year to
year, and therefore so do positions in the rankings, these changes cannot
sensibly be viewed as part of a systematic change. Indeed, only 10–15 per
cent of the variance within the 2011 or 2012 scores is not directly explicable
by the scores from 11 years before. This variance is the sum total of both the
error variance from all sources and the substantive variance; thus, even if
the error variance is zero (an implausible assumption), there is little
room for substantively important changes. Thus, TI’s occasional assertions
that some changes are (statistically) signiﬁcant from one year to another
are likely to be even more misleading in this context. Although some scores
do move in a statistically signiﬁcant way, this would be expected purely
as a result of random error for 5 per cent of the cases. As the 2001 CPI
featured 91 countries, and the 2012 index featured 174, somewhere
between ﬁve and ten of the scores would be expected to be signiﬁcantly
different from the preceding year at the 0.05 level as a result of random
chance, even if the true value had not changed at all. Taking a view over
an 11-year period suggests that such changes could certainly be random
ﬂuctuations. This ﬁnding also suggests that there is no reason for such
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Figure 2 Countries’ worldwide governance indicators control of corruption scores
in 2000 and 2011. The dotted line shows an OLS regression line ﬁtted to the data.
The dashed line shows the relationship when the y values are exactly equal to the
x values. The solid line is a non-parametric (LOWESS) smooth line, which can take
any shape in order to follow the data.
Source: authors’ own calculation.
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indices to be conducted on a yearly basis, save for the desire to generate
publicity. Indeed, this analysis suggests once every 10 years would be more
than sufﬁcient.
It is noteworthy that, in May 2011, Global Integrity (an independent
non-proﬁt organisation that seeks to promote accountable and transparent
government) decided to remove from its website the Global Integrity Index,
which had ranked countries according to the effectiveness of their anti-
corruption measures. It cited as part of the reason that it was:
a conscious attempt to reinforce a key belief that we have come to embrace
after many years of carrying out this kind of ﬁeldwork: indices rarely
change things. Publishing an index is terriﬁc for the publishing organiza-
tion in that it drives media coverage, headlines, and controversy. We are
all for that. They are very effective public relations tools. But a single
number for a country stacked up against other countries has not proven,
in our experience, to be a particularly effective policy making or advocacy
tool. Country rankings are too blunt and generalized to be “actionable”
and inform real debate and policy choices. Sure, they can put an issue on
the table, but that’s about it. (Global Integrity 2011)
One implication of the foregoing discussion is that, for large aggregate
indicators like the CPI or the WGI, a gap can be identiﬁed between the
concept and its measurement (Andersson and Heywood 2009; Langbein
and Knack 2010). Particularly important is the ﬁnding that the indicators of
the concept of corruption do not always relate systematically and reliably to
how they have been deﬁned conceptually (Arndt and Oman 2006; Lang-
bein and Knack 2010, 351). Moreover, the cross-pollination of assessment
criteria, a lack of transparency, the use of data from different and poten-
tially incompatible sources, and the potential for a tautological relationship
between the dependent and independent variables all pose serious metho-
dological problems. Such methodological problems could potentially have
a substantively signiﬁcant effect, not only upon research ﬁndings, but also
in regard to effective policy formulation.
Hawken and Munck (2009) provide a detailed examination of the CPI
and Consumer Conﬁdence Index (CCI) between 1995 and 2009. Their
paper focuses on two methodological choices that fundamentally affect the
measures. The ﬁrst is the type of source used to generate indicators. Five
(nominal) classes of evaluators (i.e. sources) are identiﬁed:
[T]hose that rely on i) expert ratings by a commercial risk assessment
agency, ii) expert ratings by an NGO, iii) expert ratings by a multilateral
development bank (MDB), iv) surveys of business executives, and v) surveys
of the mass public. (Hawken and Munck 2009, 8)
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It is shown that some evaluators are stricter than others in their criteria,
thereby generating a systematic margin of error both within and across
countries and regions. Thus:
[a]s the analysis of indicators shows, a substantial amount of variation in
reported levels of corruption is not attributable to variation in actual
corruption or to random measurement error but, rather, is driven by the
choice of evaluator and hence is an artefact of the method selected to
measure corruption. (Hawken and Munck 2009, 12).
While in the paper the critique is focused primarily upon the CPI and CCI,
the conclusion poses a challenge for all corruption measures. If different
evaluators of the same phenomena produce different results here, they are
likely to elsewhere, too. This problem does not have an easy solution and
should caution those working with such measures to consider the ultimate
source of the data to a far greater extent than is currently common. One
putative solution to the problem, however, is to aggregate a large number of
types of evaluators, thereby systematically reducing the impact of random
noise in the data. This is the second methodological choice that Hawken
and Munck (2009) consider.
The process of combining multiple (weighted) indicators was put for-
ward as a way to reduce the measurement error of the individual indicators.
Speciﬁcally, Kaufmann et al. (2007, 557; 2008, 13) argued that, by putting
different individual indicators into common units through a linear and
additive aggregation rule, it is possible to measure corruption between
countries much more accurately than any single measure could. However,
this process “hinges on the assumption that the error in the indicators
is random as opposed to systematic and independent across sources”
(Hawken andMunck 2009, 13). To the extent that the evaluator of the raw
data does have a systematic effect, such assumptions are unfounded.
Such potentially confounding methodological issues are not the only
challenges posed by such use of amalgamated data. As Apaza (2009, 141)
has noted, by collapsing different data sources – often selected only on the
basis of convenience rather than theoretical justiﬁcation – the aggregation
model is unable to offer any nuance on the nature, category or concept
of corruption. To the extent that evaluating the nuances of corruption is
theoretically relevant for analyses, this is a serious limitation. As a result,
we cannot be sure of the underlying validity, i.e. what we are actually
measuring. Even if a high correlation exists between corruption measures,
this is by no means indicative of validity.
Similarly, Urra (2007) has identiﬁed three problem types that persist in
the main aggregate measures of corruption: (1) the perception problem;
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(2) the error problem; and (3) the utility problem. The perception problem
is the large margin of error created when subjective indicators are used to
produce complex statistical constructions that can easily create an illusion
of quantitative sophistication. The error problem refers to both the internal
margins of error already contained within the various sources of corruption
data and errors relative to the concept itself; thus, corruption research
confronts not only sampling errors inherent to social science research, but
also the fact that any proxy for corruption must be imperfect by deﬁnition.
The utility problem refers to the gap between measurement and solutions –
the criticism being that overly broad corruption assessments are difﬁcult to
convert into concrete anti-corruption initiatives.
Indeed, Zaman and Rahim (2008, 11) argue that perception-based
measures are actually antithetical as a means of combating corruption,
because factors that have little to do with underlying realities can strongly
inﬂuence perceptions. This, therefore, becomes both a measurement and
validity problem. While the reliability of perception-based measures may
not be overly problematic (in the sense that they reliably produce the same
or similar results at different measurement points), the validity problem
remains. Thus, we cannot assume at face value that a reliable measure is
actually a reliable measure of corruption. If the indicator primarily tracks
something other than the actual level of corruption in a society, it would not
be a valid measure of corruption itself.
Non-perceptual measures
If the main subjective measures of corruption suffer from a range of difﬁculties
that make a straightforward interpretation difﬁcult, the question naturally
arises as to whether there are practical alternatives. Can we develop forms of
measurement that will provide an evidence-based estimation of the level of
corruption in countries using non-perceptual data?
One such attempt, focused on Italy, is by Golden and Picci (2005) who
provide an analysis of “missing” physical infrastructure in each Italian
region. In order to measure missing infrastructure, they compare existing
infrastructure with the total monetary investment in each region. Infra-
structure is missing to the extent that it should exist given a speciﬁc capital
outlay, but in practice, does not. Golden and Picci attribute this gap to
corruption. While the measure cannot speciﬁcally differentiate between
corruption and inefﬁciency (Golden and Picci 2005, 41–42), this is only a
bias in the measure to the extent that (1) any inefﬁciency is genuinely not
related to corruption and (2) some regions are signiﬁcantly and system-
atically more or less efﬁcient than others, again for reasons entirely unre-
lated to corruption. Ultimately, as Golden and Picci (2005, 42) note, such
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assumptions are plausible but cannot be proved. Notwithstanding that, the
measure is a useful non-perceptual quantiﬁcation of the scale of corruption
within different Italian regions. Under the corruption measure, scores
below 1.0 indicate the presence of “lost” infrastructure, while scores above
1.0 indicate “additional” infrastructure given the monetary outlay. Thus, in
Umbria (index score: 1.78), there is 78 per cent more public infrastructure
than there would have been had the government paid the (national) average
rate (Golden and Picci 2005, 52–53). Similarly, in Campania (index score:
0.36), there is 64 per cent less public infrastructure than would have been
available had the government been able to purchase the infrastructure at the
national average rate (Golden and Picci 2005, 53).
In a similar vein, Olken (2009) constructed a “missing expenditure”
measure of a road-building project in rural Indonesia by using engineers
to estimate the prices and quantities of inputs for the road and comparing
these to ofﬁcial village expenditures and the perceptions of the villagers
themselves. Focusing on Latin American data, Seligson (2006) studied
victimisation surveys designed to gather information on speciﬁc govern-
ment departments or ofﬁcials. This information, which provides a measure
of the ﬁrst-hand, indirect exposure to corruption, can be compared with
perceptions of the extent of corruption. In both Indonesia and Latin
America, while the ﬁndings suggest perceptions do relate to the underlying
extent of corruption, they are seen as a highly imperfect measure (Seligson
2006, 389–391; Olken 2009, 963).
The EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey, which examines the quality of the business environment, includes
questions that probe ﬁrm managers’ estimates of the scale of unofﬁcial pay-
ments, such as bribes paid to public ofﬁcials “in your line of business” (Andvig
2005, 26; Andersson and Heywood 2009, 756). However, while business
ﬁrm-level data may be useful and would likely be much closer to tapping ﬁrst-
hand accounts of corruption, they remain an imperfect way to transcend the
limitations of perceptions-based measures. Indeed, such questions continue to
ask for perceptions-based responses, albeit ones that are ostensibly indirectly
experience-based perceptions (Andvig 2005, 26). The International Crime
Victim Survey also probes direct experience of corruption by questioning
whether public ofﬁcials have asked for or expected bribes from the respondent
in the preceding year (see Svensson 2005, 23). While this again may be
challenged, insofar as it is based upon what respondents remember and
how they judged whether an ofﬁcial expected a bribe, it provides data that
should reﬂect (even if not precisely indicate) the objective rate of corruption.
A different approach, which has occasionally been used within the United
States, is to measure corruption through the rate of criminal convictions of
public ofﬁcials for corruption-related crimes (see, e.g. Goel and Rich 1989;
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Glaeser and Saks 2006). This approach has the advantage of providing
hard data about proven instances of corruption and related crimes, but still
suffers from a number of serious limitations that render it of more marginal
utility from a comparative perspective. First, such measures make the
assumption that an adequate list of crimes can be elaborated such that the
measure is not solely dependent upon a very speciﬁc conceptualisation of
corruption. If, for example, bribery is the only crime considered (as in Goel
and Rich 1989), the measure cannot be assumed to reﬂect wider corruption
concerns. Second, such measures fail to capture the severity of corrupt
actions. Indeed, under such a measure, an ofﬁcial convicted of taking a
bribe of $500 is treated identically to an ofﬁcial convicted of taking a bribe
of $5,000,000. Third, such measures assume that the probability of the
same act being prosecuted does not vary between administrative districts.
This is a signiﬁcant problem within countries, as different public prosecu-
tors may have different interpretations of the point at which it is in the
public interest to proceed with a prosecution for unethical behaviour. Yet, a
far larger problem is encountered when trying to construct such a measure
on an international scale. Indeed, corrupt jurisdictions may deliberately
avoid prosecuting corruption activities committed by those who retain the
favour of the prevailing authorities. In such circumstances, the lack of
convictions is, in fact, the consequence of corruption. Finally, such mea-
sures can create perverse incentives against reducing corruption: a con-
certed effort to tackle corruption will almost always result in more
convictions for corruption-related crimes, at least initially, thereby sug-
gesting a high rate of corruption in the country in question. From a public
policy standpoint, this is at best a highly problematic consequence.
While such non-perceptual analyses remain relatively rare in many areas
that we would include under the term “corruption”, they are becoming
increasingly common in the analysis of electoral fraud. As Breunig and
Goerres (2011, 535) note, such analyses have taken three main forms:
(1) soliciting ﬁrst-hand reports of experiences of procedural violations in a
manner not dissimilar to the International Crime Victim Survey (see
Svensson 2005, 23); (2) using regression-based approaches to predict the
district-level expected vote for each candidate and subsequently investigate
statistical outliers; and (3) attempting to exploit mathematical features of
numerical distributions in an attempt to identify deviations from expected
distributions under the assumption that there is no fraud. Of these
approaches, the third has become increasingly common, especially in the
last 5 years. The advantage to such an approach is easily elaborated: if a
suitable model can be found, electoral corruption or malpractice can be
detected reliably with little more than ofﬁcially released data. This is espe-
cially important in those circumstances where detailed information at the
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sub-national level about previous electoral results and the voting public is
not available (Beber and Scacco 2012, 211), as regression-based approa-
ches cannot function adequately. Moreover, in authoritarian and quasi-
authoritarian regimes, it is sometimes impossible or unadvisable to conduct
requisite case studies and interviews to conﬁrm corruption, which under-
mines the utility of individual reporting and regression-based models.
Several approaches have been taken to implementing mathematical
models for the study of corruption. These have mostly been applied in the
ﬁeld of electoral fraud, in part because of the availability of data reporting
the vote percentages for candidates, often by region or electoral district.
An inﬂuential strand of this research has focused upon the application
of “Benford’s law” to electoral returns. Benford’s law observes that, in
many numeric distributions, smaller digits within the individual numbers
themselves are more common than larger digits (Deckert et al. 2011, 246).
While this seems counter-intuitive, as we may expect individual digits
within numbers to be uniformly distributed (Deckert et al. 2011, 246), there
are mathematical reasons for expecting such a relationship in at least some
circumstances. Speciﬁcally, within electoral fraud evaluations, the focus has
been upon so-called “second-digit Benford’s law” (2BL) tests, which apply
essentially the same logic as the general Benford’s law speciﬁcally to the
second digit of electoral return numbers (see Mebane 2006a, 2006b, 2011;
Breunig and Goerres 2011; see also Beber and Scacco 2012; but cf. Deckert
et al. 2011). The argument here is that, if votes are rigged, the “natural”
processes that would be expected to generate Benford distributions in the
second digit of electoral return distributions will not operate. This, in turn,
leaves detectable differences between the observed and expected distribu-
tions, which are evidence of some form of fraud or mismanagement
(Mebane 2006a, 2011).
However, the validity of 2BL tests has recently come under serious
attack. Most notably, Deckert et al. (2011) argue that the use of exponen-
tially distributed districts may not be ideal circumstances for such an
application, and that the lack of any serious theoretical underpinning to
2BL tests means that it is difﬁcult to know where it ought to apply. More
damagingly, when applied to genuine electoral outcomes where ﬁrst-hand
reports indicate that fraud is known to have occurred, 2BL tests still pro-
duce, at best, seriously misleading results (Deckert et al. 2011, 253–259).
While this critique has been criticised by Mebane (2011), who more than
anyone developed the 2BL test, Deckert et al.’s conclusions remain a serious
challenge to easy interpretations of 2BL evaluations.
Notwithstanding the noted problems of 2BL tests, attempts to formalise
measures of electoral fraud and corruption based upon objective features of
mathematical distributions have continued. In particular, efforts have been
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made to exploit human psychological biases towards certain numbers and
patterns when creating ﬁctitious electoral counts (Kalinin and Mebane
2010;Mebane 2011; Beber and Scacco 2012). This can be seen, albeit fairly
weakly, in digit repetitions within numbers (Beber and Scacco 2012,
226–229). However, much more strongly, fraudulent electoral counts tend
to systematically over-represent the number “0” in the ﬁnal digit of counts
(Kalinin and Mebane 2010, 6–7; Mebane 2011, 270–271; Beber and
Scacco 2012, 224). While this may be a result of laziness on the part of
electoral ofﬁcials, Beber and Scacco (2012, 229–230) argue that the speciﬁc
relationships between party vote counts and total vote counts point away
from benign rounding-off of electoral results. This relationship has been
seen in several different electoral contexts where corruption is likely to have
occurred (e.g. Russia, Senegal andNigeria), but crucially not in situations in
which we would not expect electoral fraud (e.g. Sweden) (see Kalinin and
Mebane 2010; Beber and Scacco 2012). Interestingly, Kalinin and Mebane
(2010, 4–7) suggest that the frequency of zeros is actually by design as a
way for ofﬁcials to signal to members of the government that they are
sufﬁciently loyal enough to the government to ﬁx elections.
The application of mathematical principles to other areas of corruption
research is far rarer, although some examples do exist. Indeed, Benford’s
law itself (speciﬁcally ﬁrst-digit Benford’s law) has been applied to the
governmental economic data of European countries, with the results
casting doubt on the integrity of economic reporting in Greece, Romania,
Latvia and Belgium (Rauch et al. 2011, 253). Whether ﬁnancial data is
more amenable to Benford-type analyses than electoral data remains open
to question. However, the ability of such an analysis to highlight countries
that, for the most part, also score poorly on subjective measures provides
some argument in their favour.
Ultimately, given that corruption is a clandestine activity, objective
measures must assume that deviations from an expected distribution are
evidence of corruption, rather than being indicative of very speciﬁc local
circumstances. Where the measures are better, this assumption is under-
written by a strong theory that can be used to justify the measure, although
such theory is essentially absent for Benford-type analyses of electoral data
(Deckert et al. 2011; Mebane 2011). Indeed, evaluations of objective
measures often fall back on exactly the same subjective data that the
objective measures are supposed to be a substitute for – or worse, rely on
innuendo and received wisdom about the level of corruption in a country. It
may be more fruitful to compare new objective measures with bespoke
perception-based surveys, which can focus in detail upon a speciﬁc geo-
graphical and sectorial area (see Olken 2009). Unfortunately, it is only in
rare certain circumstances that large differences between objective
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measures and corruption perceptions can be easily explained in terms of
one measure being correct. Objective measures are at their most believable
when they are backed by ofﬁcial investigations that are capable of detecting
corruption ﬁrst-hand.
While non-perceptual measures (of all kinds) have been gaining traction in
recent academic research, they still suffer from some fundamental weaknesses.
Many of these measures face similar problems to the perception-based mea-
sures discussed above: how to deﬁne corruption, distinguish between different
types of corruption, deﬁne the seriousness of particular instances of corruption
and apply a ﬁnal ranking or score to cases. Moreover, the potential scope of
genuinely objective corruptionmeasures is narrower than subjective measures.
All mathematical measures discussed here rely on access to detailed data that,
in many sectorial areas, is unlikely ever to be made available. Moreover, suf-
ﬁciently motivated corrupt ofﬁcials can more easily develop counter-measures
to this form of corruption measure, such as – in the case of electoral fraud –
changing only the ﬁrst digit of electoral counts and thus bypassing both 2BL
tests and evaluations of last-digit frequency (see Beber and Scacco 2012, fn 30).
Experience-based measures suffer less in this ﬁnal regard, but they still require
honest reports from people with ﬁrst-hand experience; in the case of grand
corruption, where speciﬁc oversight may more easily be avoided, such reports
may simply not be forthcoming.
When two worlds collide: action versus analysis
In itsUsers’Guide to Measuring Corruption (2008), the UNDP insists that,
notwithstanding myriad problems, corruption can be measured. Their
injunction is to “know your data”, but, given the difﬁculties generated by
the large-n aggregate indicators as discussed above, they also argue in
favour of localised indicators developed in-country by local stakeholders
rather than international or external actors. Such metrics are, by some
standards, quite limited: they have little or no international coverage, are
often purely qualitative and may not be continued from year to year.
However, highly localised indicators that are customised to national or
sub-national needs have the signiﬁcant advantage of being designed from
the beginning to yield actionable data (UNDP 2008, 43).
Despite all the stress policy-makers and anti-corruption activists place on
the need to develop actionable data, the record of achievement in this
regard is questionable to say the least. In spite of a raft of anti-corruption
initiatives and legislation at both national and international levels over the
last 15 years or so – including the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, various international and regional anti-bribery conventions,
conferences, agreements, a bourgeoning anti-corruption industry and even
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an international anti-corruption day – there are few signs in many countries
that the scale of the problem is diminishing. Corruption remains as wide-
spread today, possibly even more so, as it was when concerted international
attention started being devoted to the issue following the end of the Cold
War. Indeed, to the extent that the CPI and the WGI offer any insight at all
into the level of corruption across the world, they suggest stasis at best.
How can we explain the failure to address one of the most pressing public
policy challenges facing governments across the world? Our contention is
that there are two main, inter-linked reasons. First, academic research has
struggled to develop an adequate conceptualisation of corruption, which
recognises the complexity of the concept, its rootedness in certain ways of
thinking about the nature of politics, and its relationship to social and
economic exchange – factors that call for a sophisticated understanding of
why and when it occurs. There are genuine academic difﬁculties here, even
if a great deal of research has ignored these in the search for quantiﬁable
indicators of corruption that can then form the basis for statistical analysis.
In this sense, the multifaceted nature of corruption makes relatively simple
conceptualisation under a uniﬁed concept of corruption difﬁcult and
developing a set of uniﬁed indicators near impossible.
Second, in seeking “actionable answers” to the problem of corruption, policy-
makers, anti-corruption activists and the anti-corruption industry have been
reluctant to engage in what can be seen as arcane academic debates about
nuance, complexity and speciﬁcity. Moreover, some parts of that industry have
themselves been sucked into a politicisation of corruption, which compromises
the policy process and subverts the basis for non-partisan programmes to
address corruption. Policy therefore remains insufﬁciently informed by relevant
research, while academe often misses opportunities to learn from natural
experiments and the experience of policy implementation in the ﬁeld. Both the
academic and policy communities rarely recognise the internal political
economy of anti-corruption – for example, how donor agencies struggle
with delivering a “zero tolerance” approach to corruption that appeals to
their domestic constituents in aid recipient countries characterised by sys-
temic corruption, weak institutions and particularistic politics.
In anti-corruption programmes, which depend heavily on access to
resources, there has been a powerful emphasis on demonstrating impact in
order to justify continued investment. Corruption might thus be seen as a
classic example of a “wicked problem” (Rittel and Webber 1973). Despite
increasing research highlighting the inherent complexity of corruption, the
“results agenda” creates incentives for policy-makers to favour simplistic
anti-corruption programmes focused on outputs rather than outcomes and
encouraging reliance on what is more easily measured but not necessarily
the most impactful or the most transformative.
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However, the problems of creating useful corruption measurements are
also more explicitly theoretical; indeed, research “is limited by the lack of a
rigorous conceptual framework since it is not clear how to identify a cor-
rupt act or how to generate an aggregate corruption measure” (Foster et al.
2009, 2). Of speciﬁc note are the cultural asymmetries in understandings of
corruption; thus, there exist cross-cultural asymmetries in deciding when an
act is putatively corrupt and when it is not. This suggests that research
exploring both subjective and objective indicators is best suited to sub-
national studies, a methodological caveat that precludes using the same
strategy for national-level and wider comparative measures (Golden and
Picci 2005). Given that most corruption takes place in local contexts, it is
questionable why so many measures focus on the national level.
A possible alternative proposed by Johnston (2006) is not to measure
corruption across whole societies, but rather to focus upon transparent
indicators of speciﬁc effects of corruption and the incentives that sustain
them. Starting with speciﬁc agencies, different levels of government and
ofﬁcial processes would, it is argued, be better suited to tracking change
over time.Moreover, such an approach would allow for a far more nuanced
view of corruption both within and between countries. Suppose that country
“x” has a high degree of corruption within its police force, yet essentially no
corruption within its health sector; and, suppose that country “y” has a high
degree of corruption within its health sector and essentially no corruption
within its police force. In this situation, the aggregate question of “which
country is more corrupt” becomes not only meaningless, but actively unhelp-
ful. Feasibly, both countries may have identical ratings on an aggregate
country-level indicator (such as the CPI), and yet the lived experience of the
citizenry, and crucially the ability of the country to respond to the corruption,
varies wildly (van der Vleuten and Verloo 2012, 83). Corruption in the health
sector may be a tragedy for ordinary citizens (for a particularly vivid example,
see Rothstein 2011, Chapter 3). Yet, without a reliable system of law, order
and justice, a country’s ability to respond to corruption at all is minimal.
However, it must also be noted that a possible pitfall of this can be the
instrumentalisation of action indicators. Trumpeting a particular policy area
or sector can create a reform illusion, where direct measurement of a particular
area of corruption concern (e.g. civil service) is taken as a proxy for action
more widely, with concomitant effects on perception.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to provide a review of different approaches to the
measurement of corruption. Although both academics and practitioners
have a shared interest in developing effective measurements, their
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motivations and rationale for doing so differ, with far-reaching implications.
The implication of unhelpful measurements for both practitioners and –more
importantly, citizens – is indeed serious.When decisions about aid spending or
investment can be based upon perceived levels of corruption (Andersson and
Heywood 2009, 758; van der Vleuten and Verloo 2012, 81), there is a moral
imperative that our measurement tools are as helpful as possible. Yet, there are
also serious academic implications. If the goal of academe is to understand the
world in which we live and to make it interpretable, it is important that our
analyses reﬂect how the world actually is.
We have argued that both perception-based and non-perceptual
approaches to measuring corruption suffer from some serious limitations.
In the case of the former, the principal drawbacks are that perceptions are
not necessarily a good reﬂection of either experience or reality, as they may
reﬂect factors or concerns that are not necessarily about corruption and
cannot distinguish between different types of corruption, nor between
corruption in different sectors. Of particular note, we showed that there has
been virtually no substantive change to two of the main perception-based
measures of corruption over a period of more than a decade, a ﬁnding that
seriously undermines their utility as analytic tools.
In regard to non-perceptual approaches, the key drawbacks relate to
difﬁculties in developing measures that can be utilised across different
jurisdictions – especially those where access to reliable data is problematic,
which may itself be the result of corruption. Ultimately, for both
perception-based and non-perceptual measures, the core issue is a gap
between the very conceptualistion of corruption (how it is deﬁned, how we
distinguish between different types) and its measurement. Moreover, the focus
on measuring corruption at the national level and producing league tables or
other rankings is always likely to be misleading: corruption takes place in
speciﬁc sectors and contexts – local, regional, national and increasingly,
transnational – and that very variation is one of the key reasons that it is so
difﬁcult to develop appropriate measures. Yet, for the reasons outlined above,
it is important that we continue to seek to develop useful and appropriate
measurements of corruption. For now, that remains a Sisyphean task.
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